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By CECILIA CHUI*
IN THE 1993 motion picture The Firm ambitious law school gradu-
ate and first year associate Mitch McDeere was assigned to a tax plan-
ning project for one of the firm's clients.2 In trying to determine how
aggressive the planning should be, Mitch asked his partner and men-
tor, Avery Tolar, how far he should bend the law. 3 Avery's response
was, "as far as you can without breaking it."4
Although this scenario is from a movie, it is not far from reality.
American taxpayers frequently try to create ways to reduce their in-
come tax liabilities. As Judge Learned Hand stated, "[a] ny one may so
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not
bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is
not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes."5 Because of the de-
sire to keep taxes as low as possible, aggressive tax planning has always
been an important characteristic of the American tax system. 6 Indeed,
"[p] roviding sophisticated tax reduction advice to clients has become
a big business for account[ants] . .. and lawyers."'7 Some accounting,
investment banking, and law firms have "departments staffed with
highly compensated professionals who devote all their efforts to gen-
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5. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
6. See Dana L. Trier, Beyond the Smell Test: The Role of Substantive Anti-Avoidance Rules in
Addressing the Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, 78 TAXES 62, 63 (2000).
7. Richard W. Stevenson, Government Moves to Block a New Form of Tax Shelter, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2000, at C4.
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erating tax shelter products, an expensive exercise which they would
not undertake if it were not lucrative." 8
Corporate tax shelters have become popular in the last decade
for a number of reasons. First, tax shelters for individuals were effec-
tively eliminated by Congress in 1986 by the passive loss rules,9
whereas tax shelters for corporations survived that tax reform.' 0 Sec-
ond, there has been a greater focus on corporate earnings.11 Corpo-
rate chief financial officers generally wish to increase net earnings for
their shareholders, and one way to do this is to reduce the effective
tax rates. In such an environment, a transaction that provides a deduc-
tion for tax purposes without the corresponding deduction on the fi-
nancial statements becomes very desirable. 12
The risk-reward factor associated with utilizing a corporate tax
shelter is a further reason for its increasing popularity. The Internal
Revenue Service's ("IRS") audit resources have been insufficient to
examine these types of transactions.1 3 If the low odds of being audited
are taken into consideration, "the cost benefit analysis leans decidedly
in favor of the ... corporate tax shelter."'14
Although some tax reduction products are based on sound inter-
pretations of the tax laws, many depend on very aggressive interpreta-
tions.15  The Department of the Treasury1 6  ("Treasury") has
concluded that the proliferation of corporate tax shelters has reached
an unacceptable level.1 7 "[M] ost agree that corporate tax shelters are
8. Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner's Perspective On Substance, Form and Business
Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REv. 47, 48 (2001).
9. SeeJAMESJ. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (lth
ed. 2000). "The Tax Reform Act of 1986 added [an Internal Revenue] Code Section ...
which ... disallows the deduction of [net] passive activity credits ...." Id. at 511. "A passive
activity is any business or profit seeking activity in which the taxpayer-owner does not mate-
rially participate." Id. at 513.




14. Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES 1775,
1776 (1999).
15. SeeJames P. Holden, 1999 Erwin N. Griswold Lecture Before the American College of Tax
Counsel: Dealing with the Aggressive Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, 52 TAx LAw. 369, 369 (1999).
16. "The IRS is one of [the] ... bureaus in the Department of the Treasury." MICHAEL
I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1-4 (RIA 2d ed. 1991) (1981). The IRS adminis-
ters the internal revenue laws, whereas the Department of the Treasury carries specific
functions that have not been delegated to the IRS. See id.
17. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAx SHELTERS: DISCUSSION,
ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS iii (July 1999), http://www.ustreas.gov/taxpolicy/li-
brary/ctswhite.pdf.
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a serious problem, current law is inadequate to address it and a viable
solution must extinguish shelters before they are entered into, rather
than relying on detection through current means or legislation that
attempts to attack specific transactions."18 In response, the Clinton ad-
ministration offered various proposals in 1999 to shut down abusive
tax shelters. 19 In February 2000, the Treasury issued three sets of tem-
porary and proposed regulations targeting corporate tax shelters.2z
These regulations "requir[e] promoters to register confidential corpo-
rate tax shelters and maintain lists of investors and requir[e] corpo-
rate taxpayers to disclose large transactions that have characteristics
common to tax shelters."21 The Bush administration is working on
expanding the initial efforts made by the Clinton administration to
combat the issue of abusive tax shelters.22
Part I of this Comment explores the history of corporate tax shel-
ters and the abuse that led to the February 2000 issuance of the tem-
porary and proposed regulations. Part I also provides examples of tax
shelters that have been utilized by corporations. In addition, Part I
discusses the general aspects of the regulations, their objectives, and
the timing of when they may be finalized. Part II of this Comment
analyzes the problems and concerns the temporary and proposed reg-
ulations present. Part III discusses changes practitioners have pro-
posed to the regulations and suggests solutions to the problems
discussed in Part II. This Comment concludes that alternative meth-
ods should be adopted in lieu of the temporary and proposed regula-
tions-at a minimum, the regulations should be rewritten to provide
more reasonable guidelines.
I. Background: An Overview of Corporate Tax Shelters
A. What Is a Corporate Tax Shelter?
Generally speaking, a tax shelter refers to a scheme that reduces a
taxpayer's income tax liability. A tax shelter usually involves "an elabo-
rate series of formal steps . . . contrived to lead to an unreasonably
beneficial tax result, usually resulting from some defect or ambiguity
18. Roby B. Sawyers, Registration, Listing and Disclosure of Potentially Abusive Corporate
Tax Shelters, 2000 TAX ADVISER 568, 569.
19. See id. at 568.
20. See id. at 571.
21. Richard S. Marshall & Carol P. Tello, Recent Corporate Tax Shelter Initiatives, 41 TAX
MG T. MEMO. 207, 207 (2000).
22. See Christopher Bergin et al., Top Officials Preview Upcoming Anti-Corporate-Shelter
Initiatives, 90 TAX NOTES 1295, 1295 (2001).
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in the tax law."2 3 However, the Treasury's definition of corporate tax
shelters is quite complicated: "Under current law, an arrangement is
treated as a corporate tax shelter ... if it has as a significant purpose
the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax."'24 Although "[t] here
is [actually] no precise definition of a corporate tax shelter,"25 the
following are some common characteristics:
(1) ... a certain tax loss for an investment with little or no risk of
economic loss; (2) ... involve[ment] [ofl a domestic corporation
and a person in the zero tax bracket[,] [m]ost commonly . . .a
foreign person not subject to [United States] tax ... ; (3) ...
[seizure of an] advantage of a flaw in the tax law that allocates [to
the zero-bracket tax payer] income in excess of economic in-
come ... leaving the domestic corporation with a loss in excess of
economic loss; [or alternately] (4) .. . [a] play on structural flaws
involving the taxation of corporate or partnership income, or the
interaction of the [United States] tax system with foreign tax sys-
tems; (5) .. . [promotion] to Fortune 500 companies and large
closely-held concerns; and (6) ... [likelihood of being] shut down
by legislative or administrative change soon after it is detected. 26
1. Tax Shelters Using Treasury Notes
Descriptions of several tax shelter products best illustrate the
characteristics of corporate tax shelters and how they work. One prod-
uct that has been promoted involves the use of Treasury notes. 27 A
corporation borrows money to buy Treasury notes with terms of three
to five years, and then the corporation distributes the notes to its
shareholders, who hold the notes until maturity28 and collect the prin-
cipal.29 The shareholders take the position under Internal Revenue
Code ("I.R.C.") section 301(b) (2) (B) 30 that the amount of the divi-
dend distributed is the fair market value of the notes distributed less
the liability to which the notes were subject. 31 After the distribution
23. Canellos, supra note 8, at 49.
24. Sawyers, supra note 18, at 568.
25. Bankman, supra note 14, at 1776.
26. Id. at 1777.
27. See Lee A. Sheppard, Corporate Tax Shelters: More Plain Brown Wrappers, 87 TAX
NOTEs 321, 322 (2000). A Treasury note is "[a]n intermediate-term debt security issued by
the federal government, with a maturity of two to ten years." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1507
(7th ed. 1999).
28. A bond "matures" when the debt or obligation becomes due. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 993 (7th ed. 1999).
29. See Sheppard, supra note 27, at 322.
30. I.R.C. § 301 (b) (2) (B) (West 2000). This code section addresses the effects on re-
cipients of a property distribution by a corporation. See id.
31. See Sheppard, supra note 27, at 322. In other words, the amount of dividend taxa-
ble to the shareholders is zero (or close to zero) because the Treasury notes are purchased
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and before the notes mature, the corporation pays off the liability.32
Under this transaction, the corporation-if permitted by the IRS-
effectively makes a tax free dividend distribution to its shareholders,
thus avoiding the double taxation effect of corporate dividends. 33
2. High-Basis Low-Value Tax Shelter
Another type of corporate tax shelter is the "High-Basis Low-
Value Tax Shelter."34 This involves a profitable domestic parent cor-
poration,35 its subsidiary,36 and a foreign party whose gains and losses
on sales of securities are not subject to United States taxes. 37 The for-
eign party contributes to the subsidiary a security held at a loss posi-
tion, 38 for example, worth $10 but with a cost basis39 of $50.40 In
exchange, the foreign party receives nonvoting preferred stock41
worth slightly more than the security contributed, for example, $11.42
The subsidiary then sells the security and recognizes a loss of $40. 4 3
The subsidiary treats this loss as a "'section 988 transaction' ... [and]
using the borrowed money, and the fair market value at the time of distribution is approxi-
mately equal to the amount of debt owed.
32. See id.
33. The following explains the "double taxation" concept:
Corporations are generally treated as separate taxable entities under the IRC with
their own sets of rules and their own tax schedules .. . . Because corporation
income is taxed at the corporate level and again at the individual level if there is a
distribution to the shareholders, it is sometimes said that corporations are subject
to double taxation.
ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARn A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BAsICS FOR LAW STUDENTS 253 (2d
ed. 1998).
34. Bankman, supra note 14, at 1777.
35. A "domestic parent corporation" is one incorporated in the United States that
usually owns at least 50% of another corporation. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 343-44 (7th
ed. 1999).
36. A corporation is a "subsidiary" when another corporation has a controlling share
of its stock. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 345 (7th ed. 1999).
37. See Bankman, supra note 14, at 1777.
38. A "loss" occurs when the original cost of a security is greater than its later selling
price. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 956 (7th ed. 1999).
39. A "cost basis" in the tax sense refers to "the cost of acquiring the property."
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 145 (7th ed. 1999).
40. See Bankman, supra note 14, at 1777. The security is "an option in the currency of
a nation in which the foreign party d[oes] not conduct business operations." Id.
41. "Preferred stock is usually a stock with a prior (but limited) claim to distributions
ahead of the common shares." HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 33, at 143. "Nonvoting"
means the shares are not "entitled to vote for the election of directors and on other mat-
ters coming before the shareholders . . . ." Id. at 306.
42. See Bankman, supra note 14, at 1777.
43. See id.
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[a]s a result, the loss is ordinary rather than capital. '44 Since it is
treated as an ordinary loss, it can be used to offset ordinary income
generated by the subsidiary.45 In essence, the subsidiary buys from the
foreign party $40 worth of deductions for $1.46 At the existing highest
corporate marginal tax rate 47 of 35%,48 the subsidiary saves a net $13
from this transaction.
49
3. Installment Sale Shelter
A third form of tax shelter is commonly referred to as the "Install-
ment Sale Shelter. '50 This tax shelter also involves a person, X, not
subject to United States taxes, who enters into a partnership with a
domestic corporation. 51 The partnership allocates over 80% of its
gains and losses to X.52 The partnership purchases securities for $175,
and then subsequently sells the securities for $140 cash and a contin-
gent six year note with a value of $35.53 Because of the receipt of the
contingent six year note, under the installment sale method,54 only
one-sixth of the $175 cost basis is allocated to the $140 cash payment
received in the first year.55 Therefore, a gain of $110 is recognized in
44. Id. Section 988 transactions relate to foreign currency exchanges, and gains and
losses from such transactions are treated as ordinary income or loss. See ROBERT E. MELD-
MAN & MICHAEL S. SCHADEWALD, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS 237-39 (2d ed. 1997). A "capital loss" is "[t]he loss realized upon selling or
exchanging a capital asset," and an "ordinary loss" is "[a] loss incurred from the sale or
exchange of an item that is used in a trade or business." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 956-57
(7th ed. 1999). A corporation can only deduct capital losses to the extent of capital gains.
See I.R.C. § 1211 (a) (West 2000). Therefore, characterization as "ordinary loss" is generally
more favorable to a corporation.
45. See Bankman, supra note 14, at 1777.
46. See id.
47. The "marginal tax" rate is "the rate applicable to the last dollar of income earned
by the taxpayer." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1475 (7th ed. 1999).
48. See I.R.C. § 11 (b) (D) (West 2000).
49. A $40 loss multiplied by 35% taxes saved, less $1 transaction cost (additional sav-
ings may be available from any applicable state corporate income tax).
50. Bankman, supra note 14, at 1779.
51. See id. This was basically the product sold by Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. to Colgate-
Palmolive Co. in the late 1980s and early 1990s. See ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231
(3d Cir. 1998); see also ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997).
52. See Bankman, supra note 14, at 1779.
53. See id. at 1779-80. The note is a London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR") note.
See id. at 1780. "LIBOR ... is the interest rate that most international banks dealing in
Eurodollars charge each other for large loans." ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 76
T.C.M. (CCH) 325, 326 n.1 (1998).
54. An "installment sale" exists "when at least one payment of the total purchase price
is to be received after the close of the taxable year" in which the sale transaction occurred.
FREELAND ET AL., supra note 9, at 825.
55. See Bankman, supra note 14, at 1780.
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the first year, of which over 80% is allocated to X.5 6 The remaining
basis of $145 is left to offset the $35 note, which creates a built in loss
of $110. 57 After allocating over 80% of the first year gain to X, who is
not subject to United States taxes, the partnership redeems X's share
for a fee. 58 The end result is that the domestic corporation will be able
to recognize the $110 built in loss over the next six years to offset
other gains. 59 In essence, the domestic corporation purchases a $110
deduction for a small fee in redeeming X's share. 60
B. Abuse Leading to the Treasury's Issuance of the Corporate Tax
Shelter Regulations
1. Treasury's Loss of Tax Revenue
As illustrated above, 61 tax revenues can be greatly diminished
through the use of corporate tax shelter transactions. For example,
"in 1995 [40%] of all companies with more than $250 million in assets
or $50 million in gross receipts paid less than $100,000 in federal in-
come tax."62 However, because economic information concerning tax
shelters is largely unreliable, "[i] t is difficult to quantify the extent of
the tax shelter problem."63 It is estimated between $3 billion and $30
billion of tax revenue is lost annually due to such tax shelters.64 Brief
analyses of ACM Partnership v. Commissioner,65 ASA Investerings Partner-
ship v. Commissioner,66 and Compaq Computer Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Com-
missione767 can help put the tax shelter problem into perspective.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. The redemption fee is an amount which the partners of the partnership
agree to pay the exiting partner.
59. See id.
60. A detailed discussion of tax basis, gains and losses, and installment sales is beyond
the scope of this Comment. For an excellent resource on these subjects, seeJAMEsJ. FREE-
LAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (l1th ed. 2000).
61. See discussion supra Part I.A.
62. Anthony B. Casarona, Comment, Regulating Corporate Tax Shelters: Seeking Certainty
in a Complex World, 50 CATH. U. L. REv. 111, 111 (2000).
63. Sawyers, supra note 18, at 569.
64. See id. "Some estimates indicate that corporate tax shelters cost the federal govern-
ment ten billion dollars annually in lost income tax revenue." Casarona, supra note 62, at
111. A Forbes Magazine article in March 2001 estimated that "the Internal Revenue Service
lost approximately $200 billion per year because of tax shelters." Bergin et al., supra note
22, at 1295.
65. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998); see also ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH)
2189 (1997).
66. 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (1998).
67. 113 T.C. 214 (1999); see also No. 00-60648, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27297 (5th Cir.
Dec. 28, 2001).
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These cases illustrate the extent of the loss of tax revenues and the
actual tax reduction schemes used.
a. ACM Partnership v. Commissioner
In ACM Partnership, Colgate-Palmolive Co. ("Colgate") had a gain
of approximately $105 million in the 1988 tax year from the sale of a
subsidiary. 68 To provide a way to shelter part of Colgate's sizeable
gain, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. ("Merrill") approached Colgate to pro-
mote its contingent installment sale transaction ("CINS") plan. 69 The
CINS plan involved the formation of a partnership, ACM, with a for-
eign bank not subject to United States taxes as an 82.63% partner,
Colgate as a 17.07% partner, and Merrill as a 0.29% partner.70 ACM
purchased $205 million of notes from Citicorp, and three weeks later
sold $175 million of the notes in a taxable installment sale. 71 ACM
received $140 million in cash and a present value of $35 million of
LIBOR-based installment notes. 72 Under the installment sale regula-
tions, ACM realized $140 million in sales proceeds in the first year but
was only able to use $29 million of its $175 million basis, thus report-
ing a net taxable gain of $111 million in year one.73 ACM then allo-
cated 82.63% of this gain, totaling approximately $92 million, to the
foreign bank; the remainder was allocated between Colgate and Mer-
rill.7 4 The installment notes had a built in loss of $111 million.7 5 After
the first year, ACM redeemed the foreign bank's partnership inter-
est.76 The built in capital loss was essentially allocated to Colgate, 77
which Colgate used to offset its $105 million of capital gain.
The United States Tax Court concluded that the CINS plan did
not have any economic substance, and the court was "convinced that
tax avoidance was the reason for the partnership's purchase and sale
68. See ACM P'ship, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2191.
69. See id. at 2190-91.
70. See Steven M. Surdell, ACM Partnership-A New Test for Corporate Tax Shelters?, 75
TAX NOTES 1377, 1379 (1997). The foreign bank was a Netherlands Antilles corporation,
and it was not subject to either United States tax or taxes in the Netherlands Antilles. See id.
at 1379-80.
71. See id. at 1379.
72. See id. For an explanation of "LIBOR," see ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 76
T.C.M. (CCH) 325, 326 n.1 (1998).
73. See Surdell, supra note 70, at 1379.
74. See id. at 1379-80.
75. See id. at 1380.
76. See ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2213 (1997).
77. See Surdell, supra note 70, at 1380; see also discussion supra Part I.A. The actual
capital loss allocated to Colgate totaled approximately $84.5 million. See ACM Pship, 73
T.C.M. (CCH) at 2213.
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of the Citicorp Notes."78 The Tax Court held that ACM was "not enti-
tled to recognize a phantom loss from a transaction that lacks eco-
nomic substance. ' 79 On appeal, the court of appeals agreed with the
Tax Court and held that the "transaction [ I] ... did not have sufficient
economic substance to be respected for tax purposes."80 This decision
got the attention of the corporate community, because "[b]y applying
the economic substance doctrine ... the Tax Court attempted to clar-
ify, when a corporate liability management plan becomes a tax abuse
scheme. 81 "The court found that the carefully crafted transactions
were not driven by the stated liability management purpose, but
rather by tax avoidance goals."8 2
b. ASA Investerings Partnership v. Commissioner
83
The transaction in ASA Investerings was similar to the CINS plan in
ACM Partnership.8 4 However, in addition to the ASA partnership re-
deeming a foreign partner's interest,85 the domestic corporation pur-
chased a portion of the two foreign partners' interest to become the
majority partner.86 ASA then distributed the notes to the domestic
corporation, which in turn sold them at a loss. 8 7 The domestic corpo-
ration reported a total tax loss of approximately $592 million on the
sale of the notes.88
The Tax Court in ASA Investerings concluded that ASA was not a
valid partnership. 89 The court reasoned that "if an arrangement does
not put all parties 'in the same business boat, then they cannot get
78. ACM P'ship, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2215.
79. Id.
80. ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1998).
81. Jennifer D. Avitabile, Note, Corporate Tax Shelter Lacked Economic Substance: ACM
Partnership v. Commissioner, 51 TAX LAw. 385, 385 (1998).
82. Id. at 392.
83. 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (1998).
84. See Richard M. Lipton, Partnership Interest Found to be Debt-What Next for Corporate
Tax Shelters?, 90J. TAX'N 12, 12-13 (1999).
85. See discussion supra Part I.B.l.a; see also ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 76
T.C.M. (CCH) 325, 331 (1998).
86. See ASA Investerings, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 330.
87. See id. at 330-31.
88. A loss of $196 million was recognized upon the initial sale of a portion of the
notes, and $396 million of loss was recognized on the sale of the remainder. See id. at
331-32.
89. See id. at 333. Another case involving essentially the same transaction was recently
decided in favor of the taxpayer. See Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States, 167 F. Supp.
2d 298 (8th Cir. 2001). For a critique of the Boca decision, see Lee A. Sheppard, Corporate
Tax Shelters: Getting Away from the Script, 93 TAX NOTES 460 (2001).
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into the same boat merely to seek ... [tax] benefits."' 90 Without the
partnership, all of the gain in the first year of the installment sale,
originally allocated to the foreign partner, was taxable to the domestic
corporation instead.91
c. Compaq Computer Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Commissione& 2
Twenty-First Securities Corporation ("Twenty-First"), an invest-
ment firm, learned that Compaq Computer Corporation ("Compaq")
had a recognized gain from an unrelated transaction, and contacted
Compaq to solicit Compaq's participation in "'strategies that take ad-
vantage of a capital gain,' including . . . the [American Depository
Receipt ("ADR")] arbitrage transaction."9 3 Compaq went forward with
the ADR arbitrage transaction.9 4 The ADR transaction involved the
purchase of cum dividend9 5 shares of Royal Dutch Petroleum Com-
pany (a Netherlands company), and a resale of the ex dividend9 6 to
the same seller approximately an hour later.9 7
Since Compaq was the shareholder of record on Royal Dutch's
dividend record date, Royal Dutch paid a dividend to Compaq of ap-
proximately $22.5 million, less 15% foreign tax withholding of ap-
proximately $3.3 million.98 Compaq reported the $22.5 million
dividend as income and claimed the corresponding foreign tax credit
of $3.3 million on its corporate income tax return.9 9 In addition to
reporting the dividend income, Compaq also reported a capital loss of
90. ASA Investerings, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 333-34 (quoting Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337
U.S. 733, 754 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
91. See Lipton, supra note 84, at 17-18.
92. Compaq Computer Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214 (1999).
93. Id. at 215. "An ADR (American Depository Receipt) is a trading unit issued by a
trust which represents ownership of stock in a foreign corporation that is deposited with
the trust. ADRs are the customary form of trading foreign stocks on [United States] stock
exchanges ... " Id.
94. See id. at 216.
95. "'Cum dividend' refers to a purchase or sale of a share of stock ... with the
purchaser entitled to a declared dividend (settlement taking place on or before the record
date of the dividend)." Id. at 215.
96. "'Ex dividend' refers to the purchase or sale of stock ... without the entitlement
to a declared dividend (settlement taking place after the record date)." Id. at 215-16.
97. See id. at 217-18. According to the New York Stock Exchange rules, the purchase
trades were settled the next day, whereas the sale trades had settlement terms of five days.
See id. at 217. Therefore, the purchase and sale transactions can be consummated on the
same day cum and ex dividend, respectively.
98. See id. at 219. Pursuant to the United States-Netherlands Tax Treaty, a contempo-
raneous tax withholding is required to be remitted to the Netherlands Government when a
Dutch company pays a dividend to a United States resident. See id.
99. See id. at 219.
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$20.6 million from the sale of Royal Dutch stock ex dividend. 100 On
the surface, Compaq appeared to have reported a net increase in in-
come of approximately $1.9 million from this transaction.' 0 ' However,
it actually incurred a cost of over $1.4 million to purchase the $3.3
million of foreign tax credit.10 2
The Tax Court noted that there is a "difference between (1) clos-
ing out a real economic loss in order to minimize taxes or arranging a
contemplated business transaction in a tax-advantaged manner and
(2) entering into a prearranged loss transaction designed solely for
the reduction of taxes on unrelated income." 10 3 The Tax Court found
that since "[t]he purchase and resale prices were predetermined,"10 4
and there was virtually no risk of price fluctuation because of the sale
within an hour of the purchase, the transaction "was deliberately pre-
determined and designed by [Compaq] and Twenty-First to yield a
specific result and to eliminate all market risks."'01 5 The Tax Court
concluded that Compaq "was motivated by the expected tax benefits
of the ADR transaction, and no other business purpose existed.'
10 6
Therefore, the Tax Court found in favor of the IRS,10 7 disallowing the
$3.3 million foreign tax credit.10 8 In addition, the Tax Court con-
cluded that Compaq was negligent and assessed penalties. 0 9 How-
ever, on appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that this
transaction had both economic substance and a non-tax business pur-
pose, and reversed in favor of Compaq." 0
As the above cases illustrate, corporate tax shelters-if found to
be legitimate-can reduce a significant amount of taxes. At the 35%
100. See id. Compaq purchased the stock cum dividend at $888.5 million and sold it ex
dividend at $867.9 million. See id.
101. A $22.5 million dividend less a $20.6 million capital loss. See id.
102. A $22.5 million dividend less $3.3 million taxes withheld nets to actual proceeds
of $19.2 million. See id. Net dividend proceeds of $19.2 million less capital loss of $20.6
million from the stock sale transaction results in a net cost of $1.4 million. See id; see also id.
at 223 (employing a different computational approach which leads to the same result).
103. Id. at 220.
104. Id. at 224.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 225.
107. See id. at 222-25.
108. See id. at 220.
109. See Compaq, 113 T.C. at 227. A taxpayer is negligent when he or she fails to make a
reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C.
§ 6662(c) (CCH 2000).
110. See Compaq Computer Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, No. 00-60648, 2001 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27297, at *8 (5th Cir. Dec. 28, 2001). For a critique of this decision, see Daniel
N. Shaviro & David A. Weisbach, The Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong in Compaq v. Commissioner,
94 TAX NOTES 511 (2002).
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marginal corporate income tax rate, if the ACM Partnership, ASA Inves-
terings, and Compaq Computer schemes were all allowed, the Treasury
would have lost combined tax revenues of over $200 million from
these companies."11 In addition, "[n]ot only do abusive corporate tax
shelters wrongfully deprive the federal treasury of revenues, but the
knowledge that some taxpayers are getting away with it encourages
others to pursue similar transactions."'1 12
2. Issuance of the Regulations
The Treasury has "several reasons to be concerned about the
proliferation of corporate tax shelters. These concerns range from the
short-term revenue loss to the tax system, to the potentially more
troubling long-term effects on [the] voluntary income tax system." 113
In an attempt to put an end to the proliferation of corporate tax shel-
ters, the Treasury issued three sets of temporary and proposed regula-
tions on February 28, 2000.114 These regulations pertain to
"registration of corporate tax shelters [,] ... requirements to maintain
lists of investors in potentially abusive tax shelters[,] ... and ... tax
shelter disclosure statements."' 15
Temporary Treasury Regulation section 301.6111-2T 1 16 ("section
6111 regulation") implements the registration requirement of I.R.C.
section 6111(d). 117 Commonly referred to as the "Registration Rules,"
the section 6111 regulations require confidential corporate tax shel-
ters to be registered with the IRS 18 and "define( ] a new type of confi-
111. The author computed the $200 million total as follows: $30 million dollars from
ACM Partnership ($84.5 million capital loss disallowed multiplied by 35%). See ACM P'ship
v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2213 (1997). From ASA Investerings, $170 million ($485
million total capital gains allocated to the two foreign partners not subject to United States
tax multiplied by 35%). See ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325, 330
(1998). From Compaq Computer, $3.3 million. See Compaq Computer Corp. & Subsidiaries v.
Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214, 219 (1999).
112. Brion D. Graber, Comment, Can the Battle Be Won? Compaq, the Sham Transaction
Doctrine, and a Critique of Proposals to Combat the Corporate Tax Shelter Dragon, 149 U. PA. L.
REv. 355, 378-79 (2000).
113. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION,
ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS iii (July 1999), at http://www.ustreas.gov/taxpolicy/
library/ctswhite.pdf.
114. See Sawyers, supra note 18, at 571.
115. Id.
116. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2T (2000).
117. See Thomas M. Cryan et al., A Guide to the New Corporate Tax Shelter Regulations, 87
TAX NOTES 107, 108 (2000); see also I.R.C. § 6111(d) (CCH 2000).
118. See Kenneth W. Gideon & Christopher P. Bowers, The New Tax Shelter Disclosure
Rules: Registration, List Maintenance, and Reporting, 92 J. TAX'N 261, 261 (2000).
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dential corporate tax shelter."119  These regulations apply to
confidential corporate tax shelters' interests for sale after February 28,
2000.120
The list rules of Temporary Treasury Regulation section
301.6112-IT 12 1 ("section 6112 regulations") "require[ ] any person
who organizes or sells any interest in a 'potentially abusive tax shelter'
to maintain a list identifying each investor sold an interest in the po-
tentially abusive shelter. ' 122 A transaction is potentially abusive if it has
certain "characteristics common to tax shelters." 123 Finally, Tempo-
rary Treasury Regulation section 1.6011-4T' 24 requires a disclosure
statement to be filed by any corporate taxpayer "that has participated,
directly or indirectly, in a reportable transaction."'1 5 These regula-
tions basically "require [ ] corporate taxpayers to disclose on their an-
nual tax returns certain large transactions that have characteristics
common to tax shelters." 1
26
" [T] here are three main objectives behind the regulations: Deter-
rence, . . . audit detection, . . . and reaction."1 27 In general, these
regulations are designed "to provide the [IRS] with better informa-
tion about tax shelters and other tax-motivated transactions through a
combination of registration and information disclosure by promoters
and tax return disclosure by corporate taxpayers."'128 With these dis-
closure requirements, the IRS will receive "earlier notification than it
generally [has] receive[d] . . . of transactions that may not comport
with the tax laws .. .. "129 In addition to providing information, these
regulations "are intended to discourage corporations from entering
into questionable transactions and are expected to lead to better en-
forcement of existing anti-abuse rules."1 30 Also, Congress believes
these regulations will "improve economic efficiency, because invest-
ments that are not economically motivated, but that are instead tax-
motivated, may reduce the supply of capital available for economically
119. New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Comments On the New Tax Shelter Regu-
lations, 89 TAX NoTEs 1447, 1448 (2000) [hereinafter NYSBATS Comments].
120. See Cryan et al., supra note 117, at 108.
121. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-IT.
122. Cryan et al., supra note 117, at 109.
123. NYSBATS Comments, supra note 119, at 1448.
124. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.60114T (2000).
125. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(a).
126. NYSBATS Comments, supra note 119, at 1448.
127. Bergin et al., supra note 22, at 1295.
128. Sawyers, supra note 18, at 568.
129. Gideon & Bowers, supra note 118, at 261 (second alteration in original).
130. Marshall & Tello, supra note 21, at 207.
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motivated activities, which could cause a loss of economic
efficiency."' 31
The regulations are currently at the proposed and temporary
stages. After their initial issuance on February 28, 2000, the IRS modi-
fied them in August 2000132 and again in August 2001.133 Larry R.
Langdon, the head of the IRS Large and Mid-Size Business Division,
has "emphasized that it is important for the IRS to get more experi-
ence before moving to finalize the rules." 134 The IRS Acting Chief
Counsel has stated that "there was no real reason to finalize the [regu-
lations in 2001] and that it might be good to see how they work for an
additional year.' 135 Therefore, it is unclear when or even if these regu-
lations will be converted from a temporary to a permanent form. How-
ever, though temporary as of the time of this Comment's publication,
these regulations are applicable to corporate income tax returns filed
after February 28, 2000.136
II. Problems with the Regulations
There are a number of concerns with the temporary regulations.
In general, practitioners feel that these "rules are administratively bur-
densome and the terms used are [too] broadly construed."'' 3 7 These
rules "fail to provide a clear standard to consistently or predictably
judge alleged abuses."138 There are concerns that the current regula-
tions would affect too many taxpayers, because these regulations con-
cern more than just the "transactions entered into by 'large publicly
traded companies.' ,1 3 9 Many practitioners believe that these "regula-
tions reach far beyond abusive tax shelters,"140and that a "broadly de-
fined law may curtail abusive corporate tax shelters at the expense of
131. Gideon & Bowers, supra note 118, at 261.
132. See Internal Revenue Service, IRS Revises Corporate Tax Shelter Regs., 88 TAX NOTES
990, 990 (2000).
133. See Thomas M. Cryan et al., A Guide to the New Corporate Tax Shelter Regulations, 92
TAX NOTES 1449, 1449 n.1 (2001).
134. Sheryl Stratton, ABA Tax Section Meeting-IRS Pursues All Fronts in War on Abusive
Tax Shelters, 90 TAX NOTES 436, 436-37 (2001).
135. Bergin et al., supra note 22, at 1295.
136. See Cryan et al., supra note 117, at 107. In other words, the regulations are applica-
ble to the 1999 tax year for calendar year corporate taxpayers, unless the corporation's
return was filed by February 28, 2000.
137. Sawyers, supra note 18, at 572.
138. Casarona, supra note 62, at 130-31.
139. Sawyers, supra note 18, at 572.
140. Sheryl Stratton, Disclosure Regs: Overbroad, Burdensome, ... and Effective? 87 TAX
NOTES 1311, 1312 (2000).
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legitimate business transactions." 141 The American Institute of Certi-
fied Public Accountants 142 ("AICPA") is also concerned that these reg-
ulations will affect most tax advisers due to the broad scope. 143 In
addition, these rules "suggest a significant shift in authority from Con-
gress to the IRS." 144 The following Sections address the specific
problems related to the regulations.
A. Section 6111 Regulations-Registration Rules
The section 6111 regulations require the organizer of a confiden-
tial corporate tax shelter to register with the IRS. 145 The regulations
require the organizer to provide information that identifies and de-
scribes the tax shelter and any benefits represented to investors.146 In
addition, "[a] ny written materials presented in connection with an of-
fer to participate in the shelter must be submitted ....147
Temporary Treasury Regulation section 301.6111-2T(a) (2) de-
fines a confidential corporate tax shelter as
any transaction-(i) [a] significant purpose of ... which is the
avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax .... (ii) [t]hat is of-
fered to any potential participant under conditions of confidential-
ity .... and (iii) [f]or which the tax shelter promoters may receive
fees in excess of $100,000 in the aggregate .... 148
The problems lie in the definition of what constitutes a "[it] ransaction
... structured for avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax .... ,,149 A
transaction is considered as structured for tax avoidance or evasion if
it is substantially similar to a previously identified tax avoidance trans-
141. Casarona, supra note 62, at 135-36.
142. An excerpt from the AICPA mission statement explains the organization's primary
goals:
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants is the national, profes-
sional organization for all Certified Public Accountants. Its mission is to provide
members with the resources, information, and leadership that enable them to
provide valuable services in the highest professional manner to benefit the public
as well as employers and clients.
AICPA Mission Statement, at http://www.aicpa.org/about/mission.htm (last visited Oct. 28,
2001).
143. See Sawyers, supra note 18, at 573.
144. Casarona, supra note 62, at 140.
145. SeeTemp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2T(a) (2000); see also I.R.C. § 6111(a) (1) (CCH
2000).
146. See I.R.C. § 6111(a) (2) (A)-(B) (CCH 2000).
147. Sawyers, supra note 18, at 571.
148. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2T(a)(2) (2000).
149. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2T(b).
CORPORATE TAX SHELTERSWinter 2002]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
action, 150 or if "an important part of the intended results" is to pro-
duce income tax benefits. 15 1
The "important part of the intended results" category generally
requires a promoter to register the transaction if producing federal
tax benefits is "an important part of the intended results of the trans-
action," and the promoter or registrant reasonably expects to present
a similar transaction to more than one potential participant. 152 "[N]o
quantification of 'an important part' of a transaction appears in either
the substantive rules or the examples." 153 Because it is unclear what
level of importance to the taxpayer is necessary to meet the "impor-
tant part" test, this test could potentially include a large number of
transactions. 154 Limiting the transactions to those that are reasonably
expected to be presented to more than one potential participant does
not narrow the scope much further-most promoters attempt to sell a
transaction to as many taxpayers as possible to leverage the work they
have already completed. 55
A transaction is not considered as structured for tax avoidance or
evasion if the promoter "reasonably determines that there is no rea-
sonable basis under Federal tax law for denial of any significant por-
tion of the expected Federal income tax benefits from the
transaction.' 156 The problem with this standard is that "practitioners
and promoters who have been willing to find a 'reasonable basis' for
almost anything a tax shelter investor could be persuaded to buy must
now determine whether a transaction must be registered using that
same liberal standard of construction but applied in favor of the
IRS."1 57 The Treasury's acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Pol-
icy has stated that this standard "is 'intended to be a very high stan-
dard.' "158 What level of assurance is necessary to meet this "very high
standard"? The IRS acting Chief Counsel "noted that the regulations
provide disclosure rules, not substantive rules, so they don't have to be
that precise." 159 However, setting such an imprecise and high stan-
dard to qualify under this exception may lead to an over-inclusive re-
150. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2T(b) (2).
151. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2T(b) (3).
152. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2T(b) (3).
153. Gideon & Bowers, supra note 118, at 263.
154. See NYSBATS Comments, supra note 119, at 1473.
155. See id.
156. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2T(b) (4) (i).
157. Gideon & Bowers, supra note 118, at 263.
158. Barton Massey, Scope of Tax Shelter Regs Includes Individual Taxpayer Participants, 87
TAX NOTES 192, 193 (2000).
159. Bergin et al., supra note 22, at 1295.
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suit, as promoters may disclose novel or routine transactions, 160
especially at the low promoter fees threshold of $100,000.161
B. Section 6112 Regulations-List Rules
Organizers of "any potentially abusive tax shelter" are required to
keep a list identifying each taxpayer who was sold an interest in the
tax shelter.1 62 I.R.C. section 6112 and the related regulations (collec-
tively, "List Rules") basically "allow[ ] the IRS to obtain the identity of
investors in a 'potentially abusive tax shelter' without the requirement
for a summons." 163
One problem with this code section is determining who should
be included on the investor list. "[T] he scope of transactions covered
by the [List Rules] is far broader than the Registration Regula-
tions," 164 because the List Rules apply to transactions that are mar-
keted to any type of taxpayer, including both individuals and
corporations. 65 To reduce the potential of "requir[ing] every tax ad-
Viser... to keep a list for virtually all tax advice provided to clients,"1 66
the Treasury added two de minimis exceptions to the list require-
ments in August 2000.167 These exceptions are available if (1) less
than $25,000 of total consideration was paid; or (2) the promoter rea-
sonably believes that the transaction will not reduce a corporation's
income tax by more than $1 million in a single year or more than $2
million for any combination of years, or in the case of non-corporate
taxpayers, $250,000 for any one year or $500,000 for any combination
of years.1 68 If either exception applies, then the promoter is not re-
quired to include that taxpayer on the list.169
Although these exceptions are helpful, they do not eliminate the
over-inclusive nature of the proposed regulations. Under the section
6112 regulations, a participant is considered to have purchased an in-
terest in the tax shelter if it has "paid consideration to an orga-
160. See NYSBATS Comments, supra note 119, at 1469; see also Gideon & Bowers, supra
note 118, at 263.
161. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2T(a) (2) (iii) (2000).
162. See I.R.C. § 6112(a) (CCH 2000). "Potentially abusive tax shelter" is a transaction
that is required to be registered under the Registration Rules of section 6111 Regulations.
See I.R.C. § 6112(b)(1) (CCH 2000).
163. Gideon & Bowers, supra note 118, at 268.
164. NYSBATS Comments, supra note 119, at 1453.
165. See id.
166. Stratton, supra note 134, at 1312.
167. See NYSBATS Comments, supra note 119, at 1453.
168. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1T A-8(b) (2000).
169. See id.
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nizer ... for information that is integral to participation in such tax
shelter."170 There may still be many instances where a potential inves-
tor pays a fee to the promoter for information relating to participa-
tion in a tax shelter but never carries out the transaction. 171
Another problem is the type of information the promoter is re-
quired to maintain. The regulation contains a laundry list of informa-
tion that must be provided by the promoter. 172 One condition calls
for "[a] detailed description of the tax shelter that describes'both the
structure of the tax shelter and the intended tax benefits for partici-
pants in the tax shelter."'7 3 Such a requirement "will be time consum-
ing and will clearly require review by the tax and non-tax lawyers
involved for accuracy."' 74 Also, it is unclear how detailed an explana-
tion of the structure is required by the proposed regulation. 175
C. Section 6011 Regulations-Disclosure Rules
The disclosure rules require "a corporate taxpayer that has partic-
ipated in a 'reportable transaction' to attach a disclosure statement"
to the income tax returns detailing which tax liabilities have been re-
duced as a result of its participation. 176 The issue raised by these regu-
lations is the minimum thresholds that must be met before a taxpayer
is required to make such a disclosure. The disclosure regulations list
five characteristics that are common in tax shelters; if a transaction
has at least two of the five characteristics, disclosure is required. 177
The regulations also provide exceptions to the disclosure rule.1 78
The first factor includes transactions that were made "under con-
ditions of confidentiality...."1 79 Conditions of confidentiality include
situations where "an offeree's disclosure of the structure or tax aspects
of the transaction is limited in any way by an express or implied un-
derstanding or agreement with or for the benefit of any tax shelter
promoter . "... ,80 Also included are situations where there is no
agreement, but the "tax shelter promoter knows or has reason to
170. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-IT A-7 (2000).
171. See NYSBATS Comments, supra note 119, at 1478.
172. SeeTemp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1T A-17(a) (2000).
173. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-IT A-17(a) (7).
174. NYSBATS Comments, supra note 119, at 1478.
175. See id.
176. Stratton, supra note 134, at 1311.
177. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b) (3) (i) (2000).
178. See Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6011-4T(b) (3) (ii) & (4).
179. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b) (3) (i) (A).
180. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2T(c) (1) (2000).
[Vol. 36
CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS
know that the offeree's use or disclosure of information relating to
the structure or tax aspects of the transaction is limited for the benefit
of any person other than the offeree in any other manner . . . ."181
One problem with this factor is the type of information "the structure
or tax aspects of the transaction" should cover.' 8 2 What if the confi-
dential agreement only "restrict[s] . . .aspects of the transaction that
have no relationship to . . . [United States] tax benefits?"1 83 It is not
reasonable to label such an agreement as indicative of a tax shelter if
the restriction has nothing to do with taxes.
The second factor covers transactions where the taxpayer has
some form of contractual protection in the event the intended tax
benefits are not realized by the taxpayer.18 4 The types of contractual
protection covered by this factor may be in various forms, "including,
but not limited to, rescission rights, [and] the right to a... refund of
fees" from the promoter. 8 5 The scope of this factor is overly broad.
Protection may come in different forms, including the situation where
a taxpayer, although not entitled to a refund of fees, has the right to
shut down the transaction if the IRS successfully challenges it.186 It is
unclear if such a "rescission right" is included under this factor. 187
The third tax shelter characteristic covers transactions where the
taxpayer pays more than $100,000 to a promoter for participation in
the transaction.188 The flaw in this factor is that the $100,000 fee
threshold is too easily met. Any special project or study performed by
a reasonably sized accounting or law firm, such as a transfer pricing
study, costs more than $100,000 in fees.
The next characteristic has the same problem: if there is a book
tax difference in treatment by more than $5 million, then this factor is
met.1 89 Too many transactions have large book tax differences, such
181. Id.
182. NYSBATS Comments, supra note 119, at 1458.
183. Id.
184. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b) (3) (i) (B).
185. Id.
186. See NYSBATS Comments, supra note 119, at 1461.
187. See id.
188. SeeTemp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b) (3) (i) (C).
189. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b) (3) (i) (D).
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as inclusion of subpart F income, 190 nondeductible goodwill, 19 1 and
employee stock options. 192
The final characteristic
involves the participation of a person ... [who] is in a Federal
income tax position that differs from that of the taxpayer . ..
and . . .such difference .. .has permitted the transaction to be
structured... to provide the taxpayer with more favorable ... tax
treatment than it could have [otherwise] obtained .... 193
This is probably intended to cover transactions similar to the one
used in ACM Partnership.19 4 However, it is not clear what constitutes a
different income tax position. For example, does it cover situations
where "one party has recently realized a large capital gain and the
other has net losses?" 195 What about the difference in taxation be-
tween corporations and individuals? 19 6
There are also problems relating to the exceptions to disclosure.
If the taxpayer's participation is in the ordinary course of business and
the taxpayer would have participated in the same transaction regard-
less of the expected tax benefits, then no disclosure is necessary. 197 In
addition, no disclosure is required if the participation is in the ordi-
nary course of business and the tax benefits from the transaction have
generally been allowed under the I.R.C. s98 What should result if the
transaction is partially related to the taxpayer's business?
A transaction is also exempt from disclosure if "[t]he taxpayer
reasonably determines that there is no reasonable basis ... for denial
of any significant portion of the expected Federal income tax benefits
from the transaction."' 99 This exception raises the same "no reasona-
190. Subpart F income is tainted income derived by a foreign subsidiary that is a con-
trolled foreign corporation ("CFC"). See MELDMAN & SCHADEWALD, supra note 44, at 145.
"The United States generally does not tax foreign business profits earned through a for-
eign subsidiary until the subsidiary distributes those earnings to the [United States] parent
corporation as a dividend." Id. at 299. One of the most common types of tainted income is
in the form of foreign based company sales income, where the CFC purchases or sells
goods to a related person, and the goods are produced from outside the CFC's country of
incorporation and sold for use outside that country. See id. at 145-46, 148.
191. See Lee A. Sheppard, Watering Down the Corporate Tax Shelter Regulations?, 91 TAX
NOTEs 877, 878 (2001).
192. See NYSBATS Comments, supra note 119, at 1462.
193. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b) (3) (i) (E).
194. See discussion supra Part I.B.l.a.
195. NYSBATS Comments, supra note 119, at 1463.
196. See id.
197. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b) (3) (ii) (A).
198. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b) (3) (ii) (B).
199. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b) (3) (ii) (C).
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ble basis" issue found in the section 6111 Registration Rules. 200 If the
standard for no reasonable basis is set very high, then this exception is
essentially meaningless, because almost all transactions will be dis-
closed and "less inference would be drawn from any disclosure that
was made." 20 1 If the standard is lower, practitioners may be more in-
clined to give the necessary opinion to fall within this exception.
A final exception to the disclosure requirement is available where
the transaction has projected tax savings of $1 million or less in any
year or $2 million or less for any combination of years if the IRS has
already identified such transaction as a tax avoidance, or $5 million or
less in any single year or $10 million or less in any combination of
years in other situations.20 2 In determining the projected tax savings,
the regulation has listed several items that must be taken into consid-
eration, as well as items that should not be taken into account, such as
"gain on property that the taxpayer acquired independently of its par-
ticipation in the transaction. '" 20 3 This rule does not make much sense.
Under this exception, the transaction in ACM Partnership would be
exempt from disclosure, because Colgate's capital gain in ACM Part-
nership was generated independently of the CINS plan purchased
from Merrill that generated the capital losses used to offset that capi-
tal gain. 20 4 If Colgate does not take into consideration this capital
gain, and does not project significant capital gains in the future, Col-
gate would not have much of a projected tax benefit from the CINS
capital loss, as capital losses are only deductible to the extent of capital
gains for corporate taxpayers. 20 5 It is unlikely Congress intended this
result when it enacted this exception.
Ill. Solutions
The regulations are filled with problems of interpretation. In ad-
dition, " [i] t would be naive [for the government] to think this is going
to stop what's going on."206 The best solution is to do away with the
current regulations altogether. "The current proposals broadly pro-
200. See discussion supra Part II.A.
201. Lee A. Sheppard, Official Offers Slight Reassurance on Shelter Disclosure Rules, 88 TAx
NOTES 856, 857 (2000).
202. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b) (4) (i).
203. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b)(4)(ii).
204. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.a. See also NYSBATS Comments, supra note 119, at
1465.
205. See I.R.C. § 1211(a) (West 2000).
206. Andrea Foster, Tax Shelter Rules May Not Change Much, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 13, 2000, at
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scribe so many powers to the government that there is a real likeli-
hood that, if enacted in their current form, corporate taxpayers would
be discouraged from considering any tax savings measures for fear of
the costly and time consuming litigation that would ensue."20 7 Other
methods of recognizing and stopping corporate tax shelters are availa-
ble and should be implemented instead. The government should "al-
low corporations the tax benefits necessary to remain competitive in
today's global marketplace, while eliminating the most egregious
abuses."20 8
A. Alternatives to the Regulations
One alternative method is to have corporate tax liability deter-
mined according to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles20 9
("GAAP"). Under GAAP, most tax shelters would have no effect on tax
liability. Since chief financial officers of large corporations generally
wish to report as high a profit as possible, it is unlikely that they will
want to take the tax shelter deduction on their books.210
Another possible method is for the IRS to increase the number of
audits it conducts in the corporate income tax area. Many taxpayers
take questionable deductions on their income tax returns with the
knowledge that the chances of being audited are slim. 211 Increasing
the number of audits will increase the IRS's chances of catching these
questionable deductions. "Loss-generating shelters will almost always
fail in litigation. ... 212 The IRS can always resort to the court system
207. Casarona, supra note 62, at 140-41.
208. ld. at 141.
209. GAAP are "conventions, rules, and procedures that define approved accounting
practices at a particular time. [They] are issued by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board for use by accountants in preparing financial statements." BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY
692 (7th ed. 1999). This proposed alternative is similar to Professor Yin's suggestion of
taxing public corporations on their income reported "for financial accounting purposes, as
adjusted by tax rules authorizing specific deviations from a book income tax base." George
K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson From History, 54 SMU L.
REV. 209, 224 (2001). Professor Yin suggested application only to public companies, as
non-public companies "have many opportunities unavailable to public corporations to re-
duce or eliminate their corporate income by paying out their earnings in tax-deductible
ways." Id. at 228. However, unlike Professor Yin's suggestion, this proposed alternative is to
apply to all subchapter C corporations, public as well as non-public. Such application will
promote consistency of taxable income computations among subchapter C corporations.
In addition, it eliminates the possibility of allowing large non-public corporations to take
advantage of the tax shelters undetected.
210. See discussion supra introduction.
211. See discussion supra introduction.
212. Canellos, supra note 8, at 69.
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when a taxpayer wishes to challenge any audit adjustments.2 13 If the
odds of an IRS audit are greater, and if the IRS is willing to take more
disputed cases to the courts, taxpayers may be less aggressive in taking
these deductions and playing the audit lottery.2 14
A third solution, which actually complements the previous
method, is for the IRS to increase its audit expertise. Very often, busi-
ness people take advantage of auditors who understand the general
principles of accounting and tax but are unable to identify questiona-
ble transactions.2 15 Currently, "the pay and status accorded govern-
ment auditors makes recruiting and retention difficult."216 However,
if so much tax revenue is lost because of corporate tax shelters,217
providing higher pay and increasing the IRS's resources and expertise
should be a relatively small investment compared to its potential
returns.
A fourth alternative is simply to require a taxpayer to disclose de-
tails of each specific undertaking of fees paid to professional firms,
such as legal, financial, and accounting fees. If the taxpayer has partic-
ipated in a tax shelter and paid fees up front, a large dollar amount
would appear in the details. If payment is over the course of several
years, the consistent appearance of a particular project (or similar
projects) over several years would be a good indicator of participation
in a possible tax shelter transaction.
B. Proposed Changes to the Registration Rules
If doing away with the regulations is not a viable solution, cer-
tainly the language of the regulations should be revised and clarified,
especially in light of recent Fifth Circuit 218 and Eighth Circuit 219 deci-
sions in favor of taxpayers. Practitioners have already proposed
changes to certain tests and thresholds imposed by the regulations.
For example, the AICPA has suggested that instead of using the "no
213. Such was the case in ACM P'ship, ASA Investerings P'ship, and Compaq Computer Corp.
See discussion supra Part I.B. 1.
214. Taxpayers playing the audit lottery are betting on not being selected for an audit
examination by the IRS.
215. This statement does not imply that there are no qualified IRS auditors who under-
stand the tax laws thoroughly and are capable of identifying questionable transactions.
216. Bankman, supra note 14, at 1786.
217. See discussion supra Part B.1.
218. See Compaq Computer Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, No. 00-60648, 2001 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27297 (5th Cir. Dec. 28, 2001); see also discussion supra Part I.B..c.
219. See Boca Investerings P'ship v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 2d 298 (8th Cir. 2001);
see also Sheppard, supra note 89 (critiquing the Boca decision).
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reasonable basis" standard, 220 a "realistic possibility of success" stan-
dard should be adopted instead. 221
The Treasury should clarify other terminology used in the regula-
tions. Clarification of the term "important" is needed under the "im-
portant part of the intended results" criteria of the tax avoidance
test.22 2 The regulation should provide a list of safe harbor transactions
where registration is not required under this test.
Under the "no reasonable basis" exception, 223 the Treasury
should provide more guidance. The required standard necessary to
meet this exception should be quantified. Since this standard is in-
tended to be very high, a "more likely than not" standard would prob-
ably not be sufficient. Because it is highly unlikely that the IRS would
allow 100% of the tax benefits from any particular transaction, per-
haps a chance that four out of five auditors would approve the tax
benefits is a better level of standard for this purpose. The $100,000
aggregate fees threshold 224 should also be increased to a minimum of
$500,000, since attorney and accountant fees for services have in-
creased in general, and having a low aggregate fee threshold likely
would cover too many routine consulting services.
C. Suggested List Rule Modifications
Section 6112 and the related regulations require organizers to
keep a list of taxpayers who have purchased an interest in a tax shel-
ter,225 and a de minimis exception is allowed when the taxpayer paid
less than $25,000 total consideration. 226 The AICPA has recom-
mended that this fee threshold be increased to $1 million to avoid
having to keep track of a large number of small transactions. 227 The
rationale behind AICPA's fees threshold increase is commendable.
However, because $1 million is a large increase from the $25,000 cur-
rently required by the regulations, the Treasury is unlikely to be will-
ing to accept this proposal. Instead, a compromise of a $500,000 fees
threshold, consistent with the recommended change to the fees
threshold under Registration Rules, would be desirable. In addition,
the regulation should specifically exclude listing taxpayers who have
220. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2T(b) (4) (i) (2000).
221. See Sawyers, supra note 18, at 575.
222. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2T(b) (3).
223. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2T(b) (4) (i).
224. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-2T(a) (2) (iii).
225. See I.R.C. § 6112(a) (CCH 2000).
226. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-IT A-8(b) (2000).
227. See Sawyers, supra note 18, at 573-74.
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paid fees to promoters for information, but for whom the transactions
were never carried out.
To resolve the issue of how detailed an explanation is required
under the list requirement, 228 the New York State Bar Association
("NYSBA") suggested the issuance of a Revenue Procedure to provide
more guidance. 229 This suggestion, by listing the required details in a
Revenue Procedure, will certainly be a step closer to resolving the am-
biguities of the requirements imposed by this regulation.
D. Revisions to the Disclosure Rules
In addition to the method of clarification proposed for the List
Rules, the NYSBA has suggested several changes to the common tax
shelter characteristics described under the Disclosure Rules. 230 For
the conditions of confidentiality factor,23' the NYSBA recommended
coverage of "only... the features of the transaction that are necessary
to an understanding of how the intended [United States] federal in-
come tax benefits are to be derived."232 It also suggested that under
the contractual protection factor, only a right to reimbursement or
reduction in fees upon a successful IRS challenge be included.233
For the third tax shelter characteristic, 234 an increase of the pro-
moter fees requirement from $100,000 to $500,000 suggested by the
NYSBA 235 is in line with the changes proposed under the Registration
and List Rules previously discussed. A consistent fees threshold
throughout these tax shelter regulations should help exclude the
small transactions and avoid inconsistencies between requirements
imposed on the promoter and requirements imposed on the taxpayer.
This way, the taxpayers and the promoters of the transactions will be
required to report the same transactions and fee payments on their
respective tax returns.
The Treasury should also modify the $5 million book tax differ-
ence factor.236 The regulation should include a list of certain regular
book tax differences that are not taken into consideration for the pur-
228. See discussion supra Part II.B.
229. See NYSBATS Comments, supra note 119, at 1479.
230. See id. at 1449.
231. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b) (3) (i) (A) (2000); see also discussion supra
Part II.C.
232. NYSBATS Comments, supra note 119, at 1449.
233. See id.; see also discussion supra Part II.C.
234. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b) (3) (i) (C); see also discussion supra Part II.C.
235. See NYSBATS Comments, supra note 119, at 1449.
236. SeeTemp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b) (3) (i) (D).
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pose of this factor, such as timing differences 237 and deductions for
employee stock options. Otherwise, almost all large corporations will
fall under this factor. As for the "participation of a person in a differ-
ent tax position" characteristic, 238 the regulation should include a list
of illustrations of when a person is in a "different tax position" for the
purposes of the regulation.
Under the no reasonable basis exception provided by the Disclo-
sure Rules, 23 9 the same changes for the Registration Rules previously
discussed 240 should be implemented. The regulation should specify
an eighty percent standard to qualify under the no reasonable basis
exception. For the projected tax effect test,24 1 the regulation should
point out that capital gains acquired independently of the transaction
will be taken into account if the transaction generates losses that
would not otherwise be deductible but for that gain. This way, a trans-
action such as the one in ACM Partnership will clearly be covered
under the regulation.
Conclusion
The proliferation of corporate tax shelters is an issue that the gov-
ernment needs to address. However, the temporary and proposed reg-
ulations as they currently stand are not reasonable solutions to the
problem. Alternatives should be considered and adopted. If alterna-
tive solutions are not implemented, at the very least, the regulations
should be rewritten to provide clearer and more reasonable guidance.
237. There are many large book tax differences resulting from timing differences be-
tween GAAP rules and tax rules, such as deduction for vacation accrual and recognition of
deferred income.
238. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b) (3) (i) (E); see also discussion supra Part II.C.
239. SeeTemp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b)(3)(ii)(C).
240. See discussion supra Part III.A.
241. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b) (4) (i); see also discussion supra Part II.C.
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